Recently, several authors have criticized the time-symmetrized quantum theory originated by the work of Aharonov et al. (1964) . The core of this criticism was a proof, appearing in various forms, which showed that the counterfactual interpretation of time-symmetrized quantum theory cannot be reconciled with standard quantum theory. I argue here that the apparent contradiction is due to a logical error. I analyze the concept of counterfactuals in quantum theory and introduce time-symmetrized counterfactuals. These counterfactuals do not lead to any contradiction with the predictions of quantum theory. I discuss applications of timesymmetrized counterfactuals to several surprising examples and show the usefulness of the time-symmetrized quantum formalism.
Introduction.
I shall discuss measurements performed on a pre-and post-selected quantum system, i.e. at a time between two other measurements. The time-symmetrized formalism describing such systems was proposed by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz (ABL) (1964) and has been developed in recent years. A partial list of references includes Aharonov et al. (1985) , Vaidman (1990, 1991) . Several authors criticized the time-symmetrized approach to quantum theory in general and some of its particular applications. The most representative example is the work of Sharp and Shanks (1993) . They presented a proof, which was later repeated and used by others, that the counterfactual interpretation of the ABL probability rule (Eq. 2 below) cannot be reconciled with the standard quantum theory. I shall claim here that the proof contains a logical error. I shall analyze the concept of counterfactuals in quantum theory and introduce time-symmetrized counterfactuals. The ABL rule can be applied to such counterfactuals and I shall present situations for which it is useful.
The plan of this work is as follows. In Section 2 I present a brief review of the time-symmetrized formalism. In section 3 I analyze the concept of counterfactuals in quantum theory and introduce time-symmetrized counterfactuals. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the inconsistency proof of Sharp and Shanks and its variations. In section 5 I discuss related time asymmetry preconceptions in quantum theory. In section 6 the time symmetry (and asymmetry) of the process of quantum measurement is analyzed in order to give a rigorous context to the previous discussion of the time symmetry of the ABL rule. Applications of time asymmetric and time symmetric counterfactuals in quantum theory are considered in sections 7-9. Section 10 summarize the arguments of the paper.
Time-Symmetrized Formalism.
In standard quantum theory a complete description of a system at a given time is given by a quantum state |Ψ . It yields the probabilities for all outcomes a i of a measurement of any observable A according to the equation
where P A=a i is the projection operator on the subspace defined by A = a i . Eq. 1 is intrinsically asymmetric in time: the state |Ψ is determined by some measurements in the past and it evolves toward the future. The time evolution between the measurements, however, is considered time symmetric since it is governed by the Schrödinger equation for which each forward evolving solution has its counterpart (its complex conjugate with some other well understood simple changes) evolving backward in time. The asymmetry in time of the standard quantum formalism is manifested in the absence of the quantum state evolving backward in time from future measurements (relative to the time in question). Time-symmetrized quantum theory describes a system at a given time by a twostate vector Ψ 2 ||Ψ 1 . It yields the (conditional) probabilities for all outcomes a i of a measurement of any observable A according to the generalization of the ABL formula (Aharonov and Vaidman, 1991) :
The time symmetry means that Ψ 2 | and |Ψ 1 enter the equations, and thus govern the observable results, on equal footings. Moreover, the time symmetry means that, in regard to time symmetric measurements, a system described by the two-state vector Ψ 2 ||Ψ 1 is identical to a system described by the two-state vector Ψ 1 ||Ψ 2 . I will analyze the time symmetry of the process of measurement in section 6; here I only point out that ideal measurements are time symmetric. Indeed, the symmetry under the interchange of Ψ 2 | and |Ψ 1 is explicit in Eq. 2 which refers to ideal measurements.
Another basic concept of time-symmetrized two-state vector formalism is weak value. An (almost) standard measurement procedure for measuring observable A with weakened coupling (which we call weak measurement, ) yields the weak value of A:
Here again, Ψ 2 | and |Ψ 1 enter the equations on equal footings. However, when we interchange Ψ 2 | and |Ψ 1 , the weak value changes to its complex conjugate. Thus, in this situation, as for the Schrödinger equation, time reversal is accompanied by complex conjugation.
In order to explain how to obtain a quantum system described at a given time t by a two-state vector Ψ 2 ||Ψ 1 we shall assume for simplicity that the free Hamiltonian of the system is zero. In this case, it is enough to prepare the system at time t 1 prior to time t in the state |Ψ 1 , to ensure no disturbance between t 1 and t as well as between t and t 2 , and to find the system at t 2 in the state |Ψ 2 . It is crucial that t 1 < t < t 2 , but the relation between these times and "now" is not fixed. The times t 1 , t, t 2 might all be in the past, or we can discuss future measurements and then they are all in the future; we just have to agree to discard all cases when the measurements at time t 2 does not yield the outcome corresponding to the state |Ψ 2 .
Note the asymmetry between the measurement at t 1 and the measurement at t 2 . Given an ensemble of quantum systems, it is always possible to prepare all of them in a particular state |Ψ 1 , but we cannot ensure finding the system in a particular state |Ψ 2 . Indeed, if the pre-selection measurement yielded a result different from projection on |Ψ 1 we can always change the state to |Ψ 1 , but if the measurement at t 2 did not show |Ψ 2 , our only choice is to discard such a system from the ensemble. This asymmetry, however, is not relevant to the problem we consider here. We study the symmetry relative to the measurements at time t for a given pre-and post-selected system, and we do not investigate the time-symmetry of obtaining such a system. The only important detail is that the interaction at time t has to be time symmetric. See more discussion below, in section 6.
Counterfactuals.
A general form of a counterfactual statement is (i) If it were that A, then it would be that B.
There are many philosophical discussions on the concept of counterfactuals and especially on time's arrow in counterfactuals. Many of the discussions, e.g. Lewis (1986) , Bennett (1984) , are related to A: How come A if in the actual world A is not true? Do we need a miracle (a violation of the fundamental law of nature) for A? Does A come by itself, or it is accompanied by other changes? However, these questions are not relevant to the problem of counterfactuals in quantum theory. The questions about A are not relevant because A depends solely on an external system which is not under discussion by the definition of the problem. Indeed, in quantum theory the counterfactuals have a very specific form: 1 A = a measurement M is performed B = the outcome of M has property P The measurement M might consist of measurements of several observables performed together. The property P might be a certain relation between the results of measurements of these observables or a probability for a certain relation or for a certain outcome.
It is assumed that the experimenter can make any decision about which measurement to perform and the question how he makes this decision is not considered. It is assumed that the experimenter and his measuring devices are not correlated in any way with the state of the system prior to the measurement. Thus, in the world of the quantum system no miracles are needed and no changes relative to the actual world have to be made for different A's.
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Although one can define counterfactuals of this form in the framework of classical theory, they are of no interest because they are equivalent to some "factual" statements. In classical physics any observable has always a definite value and a measurement of the observable yields this value. Therefore, we can make a one to one correspondence between "the outcome of a measurement of an observable C is c i " and "the value of C is c i ". The latter is independent of whether the measurement of C has been performed or not and, therefore, statements which are formally counterfactual about results of possible measurements can be replaced by "factual" (unconditional) statements about values of corresponding observables. In contrast, in standard quantum theory, observables, in general, do not have definite values and therefore we cannot always reduce the above counterfactual statements to "factual" statements.
Most of the discussions of counterfactuals in quantum theory are in the context of EPR-Bell type experiments. Some of the examples are Skyrms (1982) , Peres (1993) , Mermin (1989) (which, however, does not use the word counterfactual), and Bedford and Stapp (1995) who even present an analysis of a Bell-type argument in the formal language of the Lewis (1973) theory of counterfactuals. The common situation is that a composite system is described at a certain time by some entangled state and then an array of incompatible measurements on this system at a later time is considered. Various conclusions are derived from statements about the results of these measurements. Since these measurements are incompatible they cannot be all performed together, so it must be that at least some of them were not actually performed. This is why they are called counterfactual statements.
These counterfactuals are explicitly asymmetric in time. The asymmetry is neither in A nor in B; both are about a single time t. The asymmetry is in the description of the actual world. The past and not the future (relative to t) of a system is given.
This, however, is not the only asymmetry of the counterfactuals in quantum theory as they are usually considered. A different asymmetry (although it looks very similar) is in what we assume to be "fixed", i.e., which properties of actual world we assume to be true in possible counterfactual worlds. The past and not the future of the system is fixed.
It seems that while the first asymmetry can be easily removed, the second asymmetry is unavoidable. According to standard quantum theory a system is described by its quantum state. In the actual world, in which a certain measurement has been performed at time t (or no measurement has been performed at t) the system is described by a certain state before t, and by some state after time t. In the counterfactual world in which a different measurement was performed at time t, the state before t is, of course, the same, but the state after time t is invariably different (if the observables measured in actual and counterfactual worlds have different eigenstates). Therefore, we cannot hold fixed the quantum state of the system in the future.
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The argument above shows that for constructing time symmetric counterfactuals we have to give up the description of a quantum system by its quantum state. Fortunately we can do that without loosing anything except the change due to the measurement at time t which caused the difficulty. A quantum state at a given time is completely defined by the results of a complete set of measurements performed prior to this time. Therefore, we can take the set of all results performed on a quantum system as a description of the world of the system instead of describing the system by its quantum state. (This proposal will also help to avoid ambiguity and some controversies related to the description of a single quantum system by its quantum state.) Thus, I propose the following definition of counterfactuals in the framework of quantum theory:
(ii) If a measurement M were performed at time t, then it would have property P, provided that the results of all measurements performed on the system at all times except the time t are fixed.
For time asymmetric situations in which only the results of measurements performed before t are given (and thus only these results are fixed) this definition of counterfactuals is equivalent to the counterfactuals as they usually have been used. However, when the results of measurements performed on the systems both before and after the time t are given, definition (ii) yields novel time-symmetrized counterfactuals. In particular, for the ABL case, in which complete measurements are performed on the system at t 1 and t 2 , t 1 < t < t 2 , we obtain (iii) If a measurement of an observable C were performed at time t, then the probability for C = c i would equal p i , provided that the results of measurements performed on the system at times t 1 and t 2 are fixed.
The ABL formula (2) yields correct probabilities for counterfactuals defined as in (iii), i.e., in the experiment in which C is measured at time t on the systems from pre-and post-selected ensemble defined by fixed outcomes of the measurements at t 1 and t 2 (all such systems and only such systems are considered) the frequency of an outcome c i is p i .
For the ABL situation one can also define a time asymmetric counterfactual:
(iv) Given the results of measurements at t 1 and t 2 , t 1 < t < t 2 (in the actual world), if a measurement of a observable C were performed at time t, then the probability for C = c i would equal p i , provided that the results of all measurements performed on the system at all times before time t are fixed.
In the framework of standard quantum theory the information about the result of measurement at t 2 is irrelevant: the probability for C = c i does not depend on this result. Thus, it is obvious that the ABL formula (2), which includes the result of the measurement at time t 2 explicitly, does not yield counterfactual probabilities according to definition (iv).
One might modify definition (iv) in the framework of some "hidden variable" theory with a natural additional requirement of fixing the hidden variables of the system in the past. The properties of such counterfactuals will depend crucially on the details of the hidden variable theory (see the discussion of in the framework of Bohm's theory), but the ABL formula (2) is not valid for any such modification. In order to show this consider a spin-1 2 particle which was found at t 1 and at t 2 in the same state |↑ z (and no measurement has been performed at t). We ask what is the (counterfactual) probability for finding spin "up" in the directionξ which makes an angle θ with the directionẑ, at the intermediate time t. In this case, hidden variables, even if they exist, cannot change that probability because any particle found at t 1 in the state |↑ z , irrespectively of its hidden variable, yields the outcome "up" in the measurement at t 2 . Therefore, the statistical predictions about the intermediate measurement at time t must be the same as for the pre-selected only ensemble (these are identical ensembles in this case), i.e.
The ABL formula, however, yields:
The fact that the ABL formula (2) does not hold for counterfactuals defined in (iv) or its modifications is not surprising. Definition (iv) is explicitly asymmetric in time. The ABL formula, however, is time symmetric and therefore it can hold only for time-symmetrized counterfactuals. A recent study of time's arrow and counterfactuals in the framework of quantum theory by Price (1996) seems to support my definition (ii). Let me quote from his section "Counterfactuals: What should we fix?":
Hold fixed the past, and the same difficulties arise all over again. Hold fixed merely what is accessible, on the other hand, and it will be difficult to see why this course was not chosen from the beginning. (1996, 179) This quotation looks very much like my proposal. Indeed, I find many arguments in his book pointing in the same direction. However, in fact, this quotation represents a time asymmetry: according to Price "merely what is accessible" is "an accessible past". But this is not the time asymmetry of the physical theory; Price writes: "no physical asymmetry is required to explain it." Although the book includes an extensive analysis of a photon passing through two polarizers -the classic setup for the ABL case, I found no explicit discussion of a possible measurement in between, the problem we discuss here. The key point of the criticism of the time-symmetrized quantum theory (Sharp and Shanks 1993; Cohen 1995; Miller 1996) is the conflict between counterfactual interpretations of the ABL rule and predictions of quantum theory. I shall argue here that the inconsistency proofs are unfounded and therefore the criticism essentially breaks apart.
The structure of all these inconsistency proofs is a follows. Three consecutive measurements are considered. The first is the preparation of the state |Ψ 1 at time t 1 . The probabilities for the results a i of the second measurement at time t are considered. The final measurement at time t 2 is introduced in order to allow the analysis using the ABL formula. Sharp and Shanks consider three consecutive spin component measurements of a spin-1 2 particle in different directions. Cohen analyzes a particular single-particle interference experiment. It is a variation of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer with two detectors for the final measurement and the possibility of placing a third detector for the intermediate measurement. Finally, Miller repeated the argument for a system of tandem Mach-Zehnder interferometers. In all these cases the "pre-selection only" situation is considered. It is unnatural to apply the time-symmetrized formalism for such cases. However, it must be possible. Thus, I need not show that the time-symmetrized formalism has an advantage over the standard formalism for describing these situations, but I only that it is consist with the predictions of the standard quantum theory.
In the standard approach to quantum theory the probability for the result of a measurement of A at time t is given by Eq. 1. The claim of all the proofs is that the counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule yields a different result. In all cases the final measurement at time t 2 has two possible outcomes which we signify as "1 f " and "2 f ". The suggested application of the ABL rule is as follows. The probability for the result a i is:
where Prob(A = a i |1 f ) and Prob(A = a i |2 f ) are the conditional probabilities given by the ABL formula, Eq. 2, and Prob(1 f ) and Prob(2 f ) are the probabilities for the results of the final measurement. In the proofs, the authors show that Eq. 6 is not valid and conclude that the ABL formula is not applicable for this example and therefore that it is not applicable in general. I will argue that the error in calculating equality (6) is not in the conditional probabilities given by the ABL formula, but in the calculation of the probabilities Prob(1 f ) and Prob(2 f ) of the final measurement. In all three cases it was calculated on the assumption that no measurement took place at time t. Clearly, one cannot make this assumption here since then the discussion about the probability of the result of the measurement at time t is meaningless. Unperformed measurements have no results (Peres, 1978) . Thus, there is no surprise that the value for the probability Prob(A = a i ) obtained in this way comes out different from the value predicted by the quantum theory.
Straightforward calculations show that if one uses the formula (6) with the probabilities Prob(1 f ) and Prob(2 f ) calculated on the condition that the intermediate measurement has been performed, then the outcome is the same as predicted by the standard formalism of quantum theory. Consider, for example, the experiment suggested by Sharp and Shanks, consecutive spin measurements with the three directions in the same plane and the relative angles θ ab and θ bc . The probability for the final result "up" is
and the probability for the final result "down" is
The ABL formula yields
and
Substituting all these equations into Eq. 6 we obtain
This result coincide with the prediction of the standard quantum theory. It is a straightforward exercise to show in the same way that no inconsistency arises also in the examples of Cohen 5 and Miller. I have shown that one can apply the time-symmetrized formalism, including the ABL formula, for analyzing the examples which allegedly lead to contradictions in the inconsistency proofs. In my analysis there was nothing "counterfactual". The proofs, however, claimed to show that a "counterfactual interpretation" of the ABL rule leads to contradiction. What I have shown is that the examples presented in the proofs do not correspond to counterfactual situations and this is why they cannot be analyzed in a counterfactual way. The contradictions in the proofs arise from a logical error in taking together the statement "no measurement has been performed at t" and a statement about probability of a result of this measurement which requires "the measurement has been performed at t". Let me demonstrate how similar erroneous "counterfactual" reasoning can lead to a contradiction in quantum theory even in cases when the ABL rule is not involved. Consider two consecutive measurements of σ x performed on a spin-1 2 particle prepared in a state |↑ z . Let us ask (using the language of Sharp and Shanks) what is the probability that these measurements would have had the results σ x (t 1 ) = σ x (t 2 ) = 1 given that no such measurements in fact took place. Each spin measurement, if performed separately, has probability 1 2 for the result σ x = 1. According to standard quantum theory the fact that in the actual world the measurement at t 1 has been performed and σ x (t 1 ) = 1 has been obtained does not ensure that in a counterfactual world in which σ x was not measured at t 1 , but at a later time t 2 , the outcome has to be σ x (t 2 ) = 1, rather we still have probability 1 2 for this result. Thus, counterfactual reasoning leads us to the erroneous result that the probability for σ x (t 1 ) = σ x (t 2 ) = 1 is Put simply, systems initially in the state ψ I which are subjected to an N measurement, and subsequently yield the state ψ F after an M F measurement, would not necessarily yield this final state if subjected to a measurement of M instead of N. (1986, 2338) Their argument is valid (see Albert et al. 1986 ) in the context of the possible hidden variable theories which allow us to predict the results of measurements, but it should not be brought against proposals of a time-symmetrized formalism as it was done frequently later. Let me consider two examples: Cohen writes:
We have no reason to expect that, for example, the N/4 systems preselected by |ψ 1 (t 1 ) and post-selected by |ψ 2 (t 2 ) after an intermediate measurement of σ 1y would still have yielded the state |ψ 2 after an intermediate measurement of σ 2x or of σ 1y σ 2x instead of σ 1y . (1995, 4375) A consistent time-symmetrized approach should question the pre-selection on the same footing as the post-selection; or rather not question any of them, as I propose.
Another asymmetry pre-conception leads to the "retrodiction paradox" of Peres (1994) . The asymmetry which he considered is, in fact, between prediction based on the results of measurements in the past of time t in question and inference based on the results of measurements performed both in the past and in the future of time t. This inference he erroneously considered as retrodiction (see Aharonov and Vaidman 1995) .
If we are not considering a pre-and post-selected system then there is an asymmetry between prediction and retrodiction. For example (Aharonov and Vaidman 1990, 11-12) , assume that the x component of the spin of a spin-1 2 particle was measured at time t, and was found to be σ x = 1. While there is a symmetry regarding prediction and retrodiction for the result of measuring σ x after or before time t (in both cases we are certain that σ x = 1), there is an asymmetry regarding the results of measuring σ y . We can predict equal probabilities for each outcome, σ y = ±1, of a measurement performed after time t, but we cannot claim the same for the result of a measurement of σ y performed before time t. The difference arises from the usual assumption that there is no "boundary condition" in the future, but there is a boundary condition in the past: the state in which the particle was prepared before time t. Maybe in a somewhat artificial way we can reconstruct the symmetry even here, out of the context of pre-and post-selected systems. We can "erase" the results of the measurements of the spin measurements in the past (Vaidman 1987, 61) . In order to do this we perform at time t 0 , before time t, a measurement of a Bell-type operator on our particle and another auxiliary particle, an ancilla. We ensure that no measurement is performed on the particle between t 0 and t (except the possible measurement whose result we want to consider) and we prevent any measurement on the ancilla from time t 0 and on. The Bell-type measurement correlates the quantum state of our particle evolving from the past with the results of the future measurement performed on the ancilla. Since the latter is unknown, we obtain, effectively, an unknown past for our particle. Now, for such a system, if we know that the result of the measurement at time t is σ x = 1, we can also retrodict that there are equal probabilities for both outcomes of the measurement of σ y performed before time t (but after time t 0 ). The time symmetry is restored. 6. Time symmetry of the process of measurement. Obviously, in order to discuss a measurement at time t between two other measurements in a time symmetric way, the process of measurement at time t must be time symmetric. Usually, a measurement of a quantum observable A is modeled by the von Neumann (1955) Hamiltonian
where p is the momentum conjugate to the pointer variable q, and the normalized coupling function g(t) specifies the time of the measurement interaction. The function g(t) can be made symmetric in time (not that it matters) and the form of the coupling then is time symmetric. The result of the measurement is the difference between the value of q before and after the measurement interaction. So it seems that everything is time symmetric. However, usually there is an asymmetry in that that the initial position of the pointer is customized to be zero (and therefore the final position correspond to the measured value of A). This seemingly minor aspect points to a genuine asymmetry. Of course, the initial zero position of the pointer is not a necessary condition; we can choose any other initial position as well. But, we cannot chose the final position. We know the initial position and we find out, at the end of the measurement the final position. We can introduce another step with symmetrical coupling, but we will not be able to remove the basic asymmetry: we do not know the result of a measurement before the measurement but we do know it after the measurement.
This asymmetry in time is an intrinsic property of the concept of measurement and is not specific to the quantum theory. It is related to the arrow of time based on the increasing memory. See illuminating discussion of Bitbol (1988) of the process of measurement in the framework of the many-worlds interpretation (Everett, 1957) .
The symmetry aspect of the process of measurement which is important for our discussion is that the process of measurement at time t affects identically forward and backward evolving states. A possible operational test of this condition is, that the probabilities for measurements performed immediately after t, given a certain incoming state and no information from the future, are identical to probabilities for the same measurements performed immediately before t, given the same (complex conjugate) incoming state evolving backward in time and no information from the past (see erasure procedure described in previous section). The measurement described by the Hamiltonian (12) has this time symmetry. Moreover, any "ideal" von Neumann measurement, which projects on the property to be measured and does not change the quantum state if it has the measured property, is symmetric in this sense.
Recently, Shimony (1997) proposed considering more general quantum measurements which do not change the measured property (so they are repeatable, the main property which is required from a "good" measurement) but which change the state (even if it has the measured property). He constructed an example of this kind of measurements for which the ABL formula yields incorrect probabilities. However, the measurement he proposed is explicitly asymmetric in time and it breaks the time symmetry requirement stated above. Therefore, one should not expect the ABL formula to hold for this case.
7
In the appendix to his paper Shimony presented an example which shows that "The second kind of time symmetry, concerning the interchange of initial and final conditions, fails even in the case of ideal measurements." Indeed, this symmetry holds only (as is assumed in this paper and in most papers on two-state vector formalism) if the free Hamiltonian is zero. In Shimony's example the free Hamiltonian was not zero, he assumed only that it is time independent. The basic symmetry is for interchanging backward and forward evolving states "entering" time t, and thus the free Hamiltonian in the periods of time (t 1 , t) and (t, t 2 ) is irrelevant. It is relevant only for choosing appropriate measurements at t 1 and t 2 in order to get this basic symmetry. This symmetry is formally equivalent to "the first kind of time symmetry of Shimony" in which he considered "reversal of measurement". Reversed measurement is related to reversed time's arrow and although it can be analyzed theoretically we cannot make Shimony's reversed measurements in laboratory. This is why, instead of discussing "reversed measurement" at t, I prefer to discuss time symmetry under appropriate interchange of measurements before and after time t.
7. Elements of Reality. Important counterfactuals in quantum theory are "elements of reality". For comparison, I'll start with a definition of time asymmetric element of reality:
(v) If we can predict with certainty that the result of measuring at time t of an observable A is a, then, at time t, there exists an element of reality A = a. This is, essentially, a quotation from Redhead (1987) , who, however considered it as a sufficient condition and not as a definition. Redhead was inspired by the criteria for elements of reality of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR). In spite of similarity in its form, the EPR criteria, taken as a definition, is very different: "If, without in any way disturbing the system, we can predict with certainty the value of a physical quantity..." The crucial difference is that "predict" in the EPR definition means to find out using certain (non-disturbing) measurements, while in my definition "predict" means to deduce using existing information. Thus, for two spin-1 2 particles in a singlet state, the value of a spin component of a single particle in any direction is an element of reality in the EPR sense (it can be found out by measuring another particle) and there is no elements of reality for a spin component value in any direction according to my definition (in the EPR state, the probability to find spin "up" in any direction is 1 2 ). Definition (v) of elements of reality is asymmetric in time because of the word "predict". I have proposed a modification of this definition applicable for time symmetric elements of reality (Vaidman 1993a ):
(vi) If we can infer with certainty that the result of measuring at time t of an observable A is a, then, at time t, there exists an element of reality A = a.
The word "infer" is neutral relative to past and future. The inference about results at time t is based on the results of measurements on the system performed both before and after time t. Note, that in some situations we can "infer" more facts than can be obtained by "prediction" based on the results in the past and "retrodiction" based on the results in the future (relative to t) together.
The difference between definitions of "elements of reality", (v) and (vi), and definitions of counterfactuals in quantum theory (iv) and (iii) is that the property P in (v) and (vi) is constrained to "the result of measuring at time t of an observable A is a". In fact, time asymmetric "elements or reality" (v), defined as "predictions", do not represent "interesting" counterfactuals. There is no nontrivial set of such counterfactual statements, i.e., set of statements which cannot be tested all on a single system. Indeed, all observables the measurement of which yield definite outcomes for a pre-selected system can be tested together. One way to extend the definition of time asymmetric elements of reality in order to get nontrivial counterfactuals is to consider "multiple-time measurements" (instead of measurements at time t only). Another extension, which corresponds to numerous analysis in the literature, is to go beyond statements about observables which have definite values:
(vii) If we can predict with certainty a certain relation between the results a j of measuring at time t a set of observables A j , then, at time t, there exists a "generalized element of reality" which is this relation between a j 's.
A simple example of this kind is a system of two spin-1 2 particles prepared, at t 1 , in a singlet state
We can predict with certainty that the results of measurements of spin components of the two particles fulfill the following two relations:
where {σ 1x } signifies the result of measurement of spin x component of the first particle, etc. The relations (14) and (15) represent set of generalized elements of reality (vii). This is a nontrivial set of counterfactuals because (14) and (15) cannot be tested together: the measurement of σ 1x disturbs the measurement of σ 1y as well as the measurement of σ 2x disturbs the measurement of σ 2y . In contrast, the set of elements of reality (vi) given by
can be tested on a single system, see Aharonov and Vaidman (1986) for description of such measurements. Yet another set of counterfactuals, which consists of definite statements about measurements, but which does not fall into category (vi) because these are two-time measurements performed at two different time moments t 1 and t 2 , cannot be tested on a single system:
Note a situation which involves only a single free spin-1 2
particle. The particle is prepared, before t 1 , t 1 < t 2 < t 3 , in the state |↑ y . Then, a nontrivial set of counterfactuals is:
In this example, however, statement (20) has somewhat different character because it depends not on the results of measurements performed on the particle before or after the period of time (t 1 , t 2 ), but on the fact that the system was not disturbed during this period of time.
8. Quantum Puzzles. In this section I shall describe a few interesting tasks which cannot be performed in the framework of classical physics and in the solution of which quantum counterfactuals are involved. The first example considers a game for a team of three players, A, B and C. The players are allowed to make any preparations before they will be taken to three remote locations. Then, at a certain time, each of them will be asked one out of two possible questions: "what is the value of X?" or "what is the value of Y ?". According to the rules of the game, either all three will be asked the X question, or just one will be asked the X question and the two others will be asked the Y question. The answers to both questions are limited to two possibilities: 1 or −1. In order to win, the answers of the team should fulfill one of the following relations:
with obvious notation: X A is the answer of A on question X, etc. What should the team do in order to win for sure? It seems that that the task is impossible. Since the distance between the players of the team does not allow interchange of any messages sent after they were asked the questions, it is natural to assume that delaying the decision of which answer to give for each question until the question is actually asked cannot help. Thus, an optimal strategy should correspond to definite decisions of each player which answers to give for both possible questions. But it is easy to prove that any such strategy cannot ensure winning for all allowed combinations of questions. Indeed, if it does, then there must be a set of answers {X A , Y A , X B , Y B , X C , Y C } such that all equations (22-25) are fulfilled. This however is impossible, because the product of all left hand sides of equations (22-25) is the product of squares of numbers which are ±1 and therefore it equals 1, while the product of all right hand sides of these equation yields −1.
Nevertheless, quantum theory provides a solution (Greenberg, Horne, and Zeilinger 1989; Mermin 1990) . Each member of the team takes with him a spin-1 2 particle. The particles are prepared in a correlated state
Now, if a member of the team is asked the X question, he measures σ x and gives the answer which he obtains in his experiment. If he is asked the Y question, he measures σ y instead. Quantum theory ensures that the team following this strategy always wins. For the system of three spin-
particles in the state (26) we have the following set of "generalized elements of reality" (vii):
Here {σ Ax } signifies the outcome of the measurement of σ x by player A etc. There is no possibility of having a system of three particles on which all these relations are tested. Therefore, this is a nontrivial set of counterfactuals.
The importance of this example is not only that it shows how a "quantum" team can win against any "classical" team. This example yields a simple proof of the nonexistence of local hidden variables telling the results of each local measurement prior to their performance.
Let us turn now to a puzzle which involves quantum time-symmetrized counterfactuals , Mermin 1995 . Alice and Bob play the following game: Alice has a spin-1 2 particle which she gives to Bob at time t when he can perform a single spin component measurement in thex,ŷ, orẑ direction. After the measurement, Bob gives the particle back to Alice without telling her which measurement he did. Alice's task is to tell Bob the results of his measurements for all his possible choices.
In this problem Alice makes a measurement before time t and another measurement after time t. At the end she must know a nontrivial set of counterfactual statements about measurements at time t:
where x, y and z can have values ±1. Note that (31-33) are elements of reality according to definition (vi). Let us first consider a trivial puzzle of this kind, when Bob is limited to measurements of spin components in only two directions,x andŷ. All what Alice has to do in this case is to measure, say, σ x before time t and σ y after time t. Then, the result of the first measurement is x and the second measurement yields y.
If Bob has a choice of three possible spin measurements, the solution is much more difficult. Alice should prepare a correlated state of this and another spin- particle, keep the other particle undisturbed, and make a special joint measurement on both particles after she gets the first one from Bob (see details in Vaidman et al. 1987) . She cannot control the outcome of her second measurement, but she can construct the measurement in such a way that for every outcome (out of four possibilities) she will have an infinite set of time symmetric counterfactuals about measurements at time t: spin components for every direction belonging to a certain cone will be known. For appropriate measurement all four possible cones will includex,ŷ, andẑ axes. Thus, for any possible outcome of the final measurement Alice will know the set of counterfactuals (31-33).
Obviously, the set of statements (31-33) is a "nontrivial" set of counterfactuals. Indeed, elements of reality (31-33) cannot be tested on a single particle because the operatorsσ x , σ y andσ z do not commute. It is interesting that in some cases, elements of reality of a pre-and post-selected quantum system related even to commuting observables cannot be tested together. Consider again two spin-1 2 particles prepared in the singlet state (13). At t 2 the particles are found in the state |Ψ 2 = |↑ x 1 |↑ y 2 . A set of elements of reality for these particles at an intermediate time is (use the ABL formula (2) to see this):
Even the first two elements of reality (34-35) cannot be tested together, in spite of the fact that these are statements about two separated particles. Another interesting feature of time symmetric elements of reality (vi) of a pre-and post-selected quantum system is that the "product rule" does not hold. The product rule means that if A = a and B = b are elements of reality, then AB = ab is also an element of reality. (This product rule does hold for elements of reality (v) of a pre-selected quantum system.) Indeed, in the above example (34-36) we have: {σ 1y σ 2x } = {σ 1y }{σ 2x }. Note, that in this example there is no "generalized element of reality" (vii) for {σ 1y }{σ 2x }: the product of the results of simultaneous measurements of observables σ 1y and σ 2x can be 1 or −1. Therefore, the product rule of a different type: "if A = a and B = b are elements of reality, then {A}{B} = ab is a generalized element of reality" does not hold either.
The failure of the product rule is important for discussing Lorentz invariance of a realistic quantum theory. Recently, extensive discussions of the impossibility of a realistic Lorentz invariant quantum theory were based on the (unjustified) assumption of the validity of the product rule (Hardy 1992; Vaidman 1993a Vaidman , 1993b Cohen and Hiley 1995, 1996) .
9. Weak Measurements. One might argue about the significance of time-symmetrized counterfactuals beyond the philosophical construction of (jointly unmeasurable) "elements of reality", since it is impossible to perform incompatible measurements on a single system. I find the most important aspect of these concepts to be their relation to weak measurements .
Weak measurements are almost standard measurement procedures with weakened coupling. Weak measurements essentially do not change the quantum states (evolving forward and backwards in time) of the system. Several weak measurements can be performed on a single system and they are compatible even though their counterparts, the ideal measurements are not compatible. The outcomes of weak measurements are weak values, Eq. 3. Weak values have many interesting properties, in particular (A + B) w = A w + B w even for non-commuting observables A and B. I also defined the outcomes of weak measurements as weak-measurement elements of reality (Vaidman, 1996) . The weak value is not just a theoretical concept related to a gedanken experiment. Recently, weak values have been measured in a real laboratory (e.g. Ritchie et al. 1991 ).
An interesting connection between weak and strong (ideal) measurements is the theorem (Aharonov and Vaidman 1991) which says that if the probability for a certain value to be the result of a strong measurement is 1, then the corresponding weak measurement must yield the same value, i.e. element of reality A = a, implies weak-measurement element of reality A w = a. Although a set of statements about weak-measurement elements of reality does not fall under the category of "a nontrivial set of counterfactuals" (because one can always consider a pre-and post-selected ensemble on which all week measurements of the set are performed together), I find the application of "counterfactuals" for such situations most appropriate. When we discuss the outcomes of weak measurements, the statements about strong measurement are literally counterfactual. The reasoning about unperformed strong measurements helps us to find out the results of performed weak measurements. For example, in the situation described by elements of reality (31-33) the weak measurement of σ x + σ y + σ z will yield (σ x + σ y + σ z ) w = (σ x ) w + (σ y ) w + (σ z ) w = x + y + z. It might be that x = y = z = 1. Then, (σ x + σ y + σ z ) w = 3, in spite of the fact that the eigenvalues of σ x + σ y + σ z are ± √ 3. Moreover, a weak measurement of spin in any direction will yield a projection of a "weak-measurement spin vector" whose size is 3 on this direction (Aharonov and Vaidman 1991) .
Let me add another, even more striking, example of a situation in which counterfactuals about strong measurements help to find out properties of weak measurements. Consider a single particle prepared at t 1 in a superposition of being in three separated boxes:
At later time t 2 the particle was found in another superposition:
In between no measurement was performed on this particle, but it coupled very weekly to some other systems. The question is: how one can characterize this coupling? A set of counterfactual statements for this particle is
Or, in words: if we open box A, we find the particle there for sure; if we open box B (instead), we also find the particle there for sure; if we open all boxes, we find the particle there for sure. These counterfactual statements help us to find out statements about weak-measurement elements of reality:
From these results we can also deduce that (P C ) w = −1. Thus, the counterfactual statements (39-41) help us to answer the question posed above: for every sufficiently weak interaction, the effective coupling to this single particle is equivalent to the weak coupling to a single particle in box A, a single particle in box B and minus one particle in box C. The meaning of the latter is that for a pre-and post-selected ensemble of many such particles there is an effective negative pressure in box C. (An experiment which will test this is very difficult because the probability to obtain such an ensemble is very low.)
Conclusions.
The main goal of this paper is to defend the time-symmetrized quantum formalism, originated by the ABL paper, against recent criticism. The timesymmetrized formalism of quantum theory requires certain properties of quantum measurements. I discussed some proposed time asymmetric procedures which fulfill some of the properties of quantum measurement, and for which the time-symmetrized formalism yields incorrect predictions. I showed, however, that for any ideal measurement as well as for any von Neumann type measurement (ideal or not ideal) the time-symmetrized formalism is valid. This answers some of the criticism of the time-symmetrized formalism. However, the key argument of the critics was different; it was an alleged proof, repeated by several authors, showing that in certain situations counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule leads to a contradiction with the predictions of quantum theory. I argued here that these situations were not of "counterfactual" nature. The way of reasoning which lead the authors to a contradiction was not the "counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule" but a logical error. The error was in calculating the probability for the result of a certain experiment assuming that this experiments was not performed. Not only that the authors of the proof assume that the measurement was not performed in the actual world (as is usually done in discussing counterfactuals in quantum theory) but also that it was not performed in the counterfactual world, for which the statements about the probability of the result of this measurement was made.
The argumentation of the critics of the time-symmetrized quantum formalism was that the ABL rule for the cases when the measurement was actually performed is correct, but philosophically not interesting, while the counterfactual interpretation is interesting but incorrect. Showing that their "counterfactual interpretation" is incorrect still leaves us with the claim that time-symmetrized formalism "yields no fresh insights about the fundamental interpretive issues in quantum mechanics" (Sharp and Shanks, 1993) . In order to refute this argument I made an analysis of counterfactuals in quantum theory which I believe is important by itself. I narrowed the concept of "counterfactuals" to statements about properties of the results of quantum measurements which would be valid if these measurements were performed. The crucial issue for counterfactuals in quantum theory is what is held "fixed" in counterfactual worlds. I proposed defining "results of all measurements (except measurements at time t)" as all that is fixed. I showed that this definition for a pre-selected situations is equivalent to the usual definition of counterfactuals. However, contrary to the usual approach, this definition is also applicable for pre-and post-selected situation, and it yields time-symmetrized counterfactuals with the results of measurements fixed both in the past and in the future.
The first nontrivial type of situations for which these counterfactuals can be applied is when there is a set of statements which cannot be tested on a single system. Therefore, the set of counterfactual statements about quantum system on which these measurement might have been performed cannot be equivalent to a set of statements about actually performed measurements. There are such sets of nontrivial counterfactuals both for preselected only quantum systems and for pre-and post-quantum systems. (Note, however, that only for pre-and post-selected situations there are nontrivial sets of counterfactuals which are "elements of reality", i.e. definite results of measurements. For pre-selected situations, definite properties of the results of measurements have to be considered.) These nontrivial sets of counterfactuals play an important role in ongoing discussions of the locality and Lorentz invariance of quantum theory.
The second application of time-symmetrized counterfactuals I have presented here is the connection between "elements of reality" and weak coupling to a quantum system. I considered a pre-and post-selected system on which no intermediate strong measurements were performed. Then, "elements of reality" are literally counterfactual statements about definite results of measurements which actually were not performed. These counterfactual statements helped to characterize weak measurements which actually took place. The outcomes of these weak measurements are weak values (another time symmetric concept) which yield a simple picture of a pre-and post-selected quantum system. I find this picture important because it allowed us to see numerous surprising quantum effects which are hidden in the framework of the standard approach in a very complicated mathematics of some peculiar interference effects (e.g. Aharonov et al. , 1993 Vaidman 1991) .
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